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Abstract 
 
In this paper I study corner solutions in a Model of Military Alliances. In 
particular I analyze how corner solutions affect the level of defence 
expenditure. I find that accounting for corner solutions, the so called 
‘Exploitation Hypothesis’ may no longer be reversed and can indeed be re – 
inforced as one moves from the Cournot to the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Starting with Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), the economics literature on 
the theory of military alliances has studied the behavior of two allied 
countries, which interact strategically in order to identify the level of 
provision of defence. Defence is viewed as a pure public good, such that the 
benefits from defence are non rival and non excludable. The two countries 
have been assumed to act in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg fashion and the 
following conclusions have been reached: 
 
1. In a Cournot set up, “...the large rich ally shoulders the defence burdens of 
the small, poor allies by providing the latter with a relatively free ride. This 
proposition is known as the ‘exploitation hypothesis’ ” (Sandler and Hartley, 
2001). 
 
2. The resulting level of defence expenditure is inefficient, “since (differently 
from the private goods case) benefits conferred on others by an agent's action 
are not taken into account” (Sandler, 1992). 
 
3. In a Stackelberg set up the ‘exploitation hypothesis’ is however reversed in 
the sense that the poorer country contributes to the defence expenditure: “the 
leader country chooses a lower level of expenditure on guns than in the 
(Cournot) Nash equilibrium while the ally is forced to choose a higher level 
of guns spending. Total spending on guns by the alliance falls” (Bruce, 1990). 
 
    At second sight, however, it appears that so far the analysis has 
disregarded corners solutions. Filling this gap may be important because 
corner solutions may arise with well-bahaved preferences, and because there 
are various historical examples where corners solutions seem relevant. The 
military alliance between US and Japan is a case in point (Carpenter, 1996). 
Fearing the possibility of a conflict in East Asia and the fallout of 
consequences, the US decided to reaffirm the already existing military 
alliance with Japan. However Japan did not contribute to the related defence 
expenditure (at the time of the events the US had several military bases in the 
Japanese soil). Thus the game between US and Japan appears to had been at a 
corner solution, where Japan had given to the US the permission to use its 
soil for military purposes, enjoying the benefits of defence without sharing 
the costs. 
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    In what follows, we provide a Cobb-Douglas example where:    
 
1. in the Cournot scenario, the strategic interaction of two countries may 
result either in an interior or in a corner equilibrium; 
 
2. in a Stackelberg scenario, the leader might be the only one to contribute to 
the provision of defence, if the level of income of the follower falls below a 
certain threshold; in this case the ‘exploitation hypothesis’ is not reversed 
under the Stackelberg assumption. 
 
2. Cournot equilibria 
 
We assume that both countries have a Cobb - Douglas utility function (i 
= 1,2): 
 
 
Ui =lnyi + lnQ                                         (1) 
 
where: 
 
• yi is the country's consumption of the private good; 
• Q is the total amount of the pure public good and it is equal to the sum 
of the nations' contributions (Q = qi + qj). This provision technology 
implies that the public good is perfectly substitutable between the two 
countries. 
 
Each country is constrained by a linear budget constraint Ii =yi + pqi, where 
the price of the private good is normalized to 1 and the price of the public 
good is denoted by p. The basic problem for country ‘i’ can be written as: 
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and the first-order condition for a maximum is: 
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The reaction curve for country ‘i’ is as follows: 
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Inverting the indices gives the reaction curve for the other country.  
Inspection of (4) reveals that the Cournot equilibrium can be of three 
types: 
     
• If (Ii/2) < Ij < 2Ii, we have the standard Cournot equilibrium with 
interior solution that is usually considered in the literature: 
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• If Ij > 2Ii, however, the Cournot equilibrium is attained at a point that 
corresponds to a corner solution of country i's maximization problem: 
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• Finally, if Ij < Ii/2 the equilibrium is again a corner solution equilibrium, 
but now it is country j's contribution that vanishes: 
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3. Stackelberg equilibria 
 
 
    In this section we suppose that the first country is the leader, while the 
second one is the follower. Following the literature, leadership is defined on 
the basis of the level of income. To fix ideas, suppose that Ii > Ij so that 
country ‘i’ leads. To determine the Stackelberg equilibrium, we first compute 
the follower's reaction curve, as in (4), and then we solve the leader's 
maximization problem. 
 
    If Ij/p ≥ qi ≥ 0, country ‘i’ solves: 
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The first-order condition for a maximum is: 
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The equilibrium level of provision for the leader therefore is: 
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and is always strictly positive. In order to obtain the equilibrium provision 
level for the follower, we substitute qiS* into the follower's reaction curve 
obtaining: 
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When Ij > (3/5)Ii, this solution delivers the well known reversal of the 
‘exploitation hypothesis’. Note, however, that the ‘exploitation hypothesis’ is 
not reversed when the smaller country is sufficiently small, i.e. Ij < (3/5)Ii; in 
particular, if the small country is very small (i.e. Ij < (1/3)Ii) the Stackelberg 
equilibrium is attained at a corner solution where qjS* = 0 and qiS* = (Ii/2p). 
If instead Ij/p < qi , then the leader's maximization problem is: 
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The first-order condition for a maximum is: 
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whence the equilibrium provisions of two countries can be immediately 
calculated as: 
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As it turns out, when the Cournot equilibrium entails a corner solution for 
the smaller country, the Stackelberg equilibrium is also characterized by a 
corner solution. In this case, the ‘exploitation hypothesis’ is not reversed as 
we move from the Cournot to the Stackelberg scenario. 
    Summarizing, if in the Cournot set-up the equilibrium is interior, then in a 
Stackelberg set-up we may end up with another interior solution, where the 
leader still provides more defence than the follower, or we may jump to a 
corner solution where only the leader provides defence. If instead in the 
Cournot set-up the equilibrium is attained at a corner, then the Stackelberg 
equilibrium is also necessarily at a corner.     
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Figure 1: Interior Solution 
     
    Figure 1 depicts the indifference curves of the country ‘i’ (the small 
country) and the two countries' reaction curves. It illustrates the case where 
the equilibrium jumps from an interior solution to a corner solution as we 
move from Cournot to Stackelberg. In this case the ‘exploitation hypothesis’ 
is not reversed; in a sense it is reinforced in that the ratio between the smaller 
country's provision of defences and that of the larger countries falls as we 
move from the Cournot to the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
    More generally, the ‘exploitation hypothesis’ is reversed only if the 
difference in the size of the two countries is not too large. When the countries 
are highly asymmetric in size, the defence provision game has a corner 
solution. The occurrence of a corner solution in which the follower free rides 
and the leader bear the burden of defence fully is even more likely in a 
Stackelberg set-up than in a Cournot set-up. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
    In this paper we have presented a model of military alliance where the 
strategic interaction between two countries is studied both in a Cournot and 
in a Stackelberg framework. Corner solutions were considered, giving rise to 
the possibility of situations where only one of the two countries bears the 
burden of defence. When countries are highly asymmetric, not only is the 
`exploitation hypothesis' not reversed in a Stackelberg equilibrium; it can 
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actually be reinforced. Our results regarding corner solutions in military 
alliance games may help explain certain historical cases, as the military 
alliance between US and Japan. 
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